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Abstract
Deep learning methods for graphs achieve remarkable performance on many tasks.
However, despite the proliferation of such methods and their success, recent find-
ings indicate that small, unnoticeable perturbations of graph structure can catas-
trophically reduce performance of even the strongest and most popular Graph
Neural Networks (GNNs). Here, we develop GNNGUARD, a general defense
approach against a variety of training-time attacks that perturb the discrete graph
structure. GNNGUARD can be straightforwardly incorporated into any GNN. Its
core principle is to detect and quantify the relationship between the graph structure
and node features, if one exists, and then exploit that relationship to mitigate nega-
tive effects of the attack. GNNGUARD uses network theory of homophily to learn
how best assign higher weights to edges connecting similar nodes while pruning
edges between unrelated nodes. The revised edges then allow the underlying GNN
to robustly propagate neural messages in the graph. GNNGUARD introduces
two novel components, the neighbor importance estimation, and the layer-wise
graph memory, and we show empirically that both components are necessary for a
successful defense. Across five GNNs, three defense methods, and four datasets,
including a challenging human disease graph, experiments show that GNNGUARD
outperforms existing defense approaches by 15.3% on average. Remarkably, GN-
NGUARD can effectively restore the state-of-the-art performance of GNNs in the
face of various adversarial attacks, including targeted and non-targeted attacks.
1 Introduction
Deep learning on graphs and Graph Neural Networks (GNNs), in particular, have achieved remarkable
success in a variety of application areas [1, 2, 3, 4]. The key to the success of GNNs is the neural
message passing scheme [5] in which neural messages are propagated along edges of the graph
and typically optimized for performance on a downstream task. In doing so, the GNN is trained
to aggregate information from neighbors for every node in each layer, which allows the model to
eventually generate representations that capture useful node feature as well as topological structure
information [6, 7]. While the aggregation of neighbor nodes’ information is a powerful principle of
representation learning, the way that GNNs exchange that information between nodes makes them
vulnerable to adversarial attacks [8].
Adversarial attacks on graphs, which carefully rewire the graph topology by selecting a small
number of edges or inject carefully designed perturbations to node features, can contaminate local
node neighborhoods, degrade learned representations, confuse the GNN to misclassify nodes in
the graph, and can catastrophically reduce the performance of even the strongest and most popular
GNNs [9, 10]. This lack of GNN robustness is a critical issue in many application areas where
adversarial perturbations can not only undermine public trust and slow down science and development
of technology but can also substantially interfere with human decision making [11]. For this reason, it
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is vital to develop GNNs that are robust against adversarial attacks. While the vulnerability of machine
learning methods to adversarial attacks has raised many concerns and has led to theoretical insights
into robustness [12] and the development of effective defense techniques [9, 11, 13], adversarial
attacks and defense on graphs remain poorly understood.
Poisoned
node
Adversarial attack
Ground-truth label 1
Ground-truth label 2
Predict
Classifier with GNNGuard
GNNGuard[GNN]
Poisoned node is classified correctly
Predict
Classifier with no defense
GNN
Edge Perturbed edge
Poisoned node is classified incorrectly
A
B
Figure 1: A. Small, adversarial perturbations
of the graph structure and node features lead
to GNN to misclassifying target u. B. The
GNN, when integrated with GNNGUARD,
correctly classifies the target.
Present work. Here, we introduce GNNGUARD1, an ap-
proach that can defend any GNN model against a variety
of training-time attacks that perturb graph structure (Fig-
ure 1). GNNGUARD takes as input an existing GNN
model. It mitigates adverse effects by modifying the
GNN’s neural message passing operators. In particular,
it revises the message passing architecture such that the
revised model is robust to adversarial perturbations while
at the same time the model keeps it representation learn-
ing capacity. To this end, GNNGUARD develops two key
components that estimate neighbor importance for every
node and coarsen the graph through an efficient memory
layer. The former component dynamically adjusts the rel-
evance of nodes’ local network neighborhoods, prunes
likely fake edges, and assigns less weight to suspicious
edges based on network theory of homophily [14]. The
latter components stabilizes the evolution of graph struc-
ture by preserving, in part the memory from a previous
layer in the GNN.
We compare GNNGUARD to three state-of-the-art GNN defenders across four datasets and under
a variety of attack types, including direct targeted, influence targeted, and non-targeted attacks.
Experiments show that GNNGUARD improves state-of-the-art methods by up to 15.3% in defense
performance. Importantly, unlike existing GNN defenders [15, 16, 17, 18], GNNGUARD is a general
approach and can be effortlessly combined with any GNN architecture. To that end, we integrate
GNNGUARD into five GNN models. Remarkably, results show that GNNGUARD can effectively
restore state-of-the-art performance of even the strongest and most popular GNNs [3, 19, 7, 20, 21],
thereby demonstrating broad applicability and relevance of GNNGUARD for graph machine-learning.
2 Related Work
Adversarial attacks in continuous and discrete space. Adversarial attacks on machine learning
have received increasing attention in recent years [12, 22]. The attackers add small perturbations
on the samples to completely alter the output of the machine learning model. The deliberately
manipulated perturbations are often designed to be unnoticeable. Modern studies have shown
that machine leaning models, especially deep neural networks, are highly fragile to adversarial
attacks [23, 24, 25]. The majority of existing works focus on grid data or independent samples [26]
whilst a few work investigate adversarial attack on graphs.
Adversarial attacks on graphs. Based on the goal of the attacker, adversarial attacks on graphs [27,
28] can be divided into poisoning attacksi i tts sa aci i tt (e.g., Nettack [8]) that perturb the graph in training-time and
evasion attacksi tts se a a aci tt (e.g., RL-S2V [28]) that perturb the graph in testing-time. GNNGUARD is designed
to improve robustness of GNNs against poisoning attacks. There are two types of poisoning attacks: a
targeted attack and a non-targeted attack [29]. The former deceives the model to misclassify a specific
node (i.e., target node) [8] while the latter degrades the overall performance of the trained model [26].
The targeted attack can be categorized into direct targeted attack where the attacker perturbs edges
touching the target node and the influence targeted attack where the attacker only manipulates edges
of the target node’s neighbors. Nettack [8] generates perturbations by modifying graph structure (i.e.,
structure attack) and node attributes (i.e., feature attack) such that perturbations maximally destroy
downstream GNN’s predictions. Bojcheshki et al. [30] derive adversarial perturbations that poison
the graph structure. Similarly, Zügner et al. [26] propose a non-targeted poisoning attacker by using
1We will share the GNNGUARD implementation, baseline defense algorithms, and all datasets upon publica-
tion.
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meta-gradient to solve bi-level problem. In contrast, our GNNGUARD is a defense approach that
inspects the graph and recovers adversarial perturbations.
Defense on graphs. While deep learning on graphs has shown exciting results in a variety of
applications [5, 21, 31, 32, 33], little attention has been paid to the robustness of such models, in
contrast to an abundance of research for image (e.g., [34]) and text (e.g., [35]) adversarial defense.
We briefly overview the state-of-the-art defense methods on graphs. GNN-Jaccard [15] is a defense
approach that pre-processes the adjacency matrix of the graph to identify the manipulated edges.
While GNN-Jaccard can defend targeted adversarial attacks on known and already existing GNNs,
there has also been work on novel, robust GNN models. For example, RobustGCN [17] is a novel
GNN that adopts Gaussian distributions as the hidden representations of nodes in each convolutional
layer to absorb the effect of an attack. Similarly, GNN-SVD [16] uses a low-rank approximation
of adjacency matrix that drops noisy information through an SVD decomposition. Tang et al. [18]
improve the robustness of GNNs against poisoning attack through transfer learning but has a limitation
that requires several unperturbed graphs from the similar domain during training. However, all these
approaches have drawbacks (see Section 4.3) that prevent them from realizing their potential for
defense to the fullest extent. GNNGUARD eliminates these drawbacks, successfully defending
targeted and non-targeted poisoning attacks on any GNN without decreasing its accuracy.
3 Background and Problem Formulation
Let G = (V, E ,X) denotes a graph where V is the set of nodes, E is the set of edges and X =
{x1, ...,xn},xu ∈ RM is the M -dimensional node feature for node u ∈ V . Let N = |V| and
E = |E| denote the number of nodes and edges, respectively. Let A ∈ RN×N denote an adjacency
matrix whose element Auv ∈ {0, 1} indicates existence of edge euv that connects node u and v. We
use Nu to denote immediate neighbors of node u, including the node itself (u ∈ Nu). We use N ∗u
to indicate u’s neighborhood, excluding the node itself (u /∈ N ∗u ). Without loss of generality, we
consider node classification task, wherein a GNN f classifies nodes into C labels. Let yˆu = fu(G)
denote prediction for node u, and let yu ∈ {1, . . . , C} denote the associated ground-truth label for
node u. To degrade the performance of f , an adversarial attacker perturbs edges in G, resulting in the
perturbed version of G, which we call G′ = (V, E ′,X) (A′ is adjacency matrix of G′).
Background on graph neural networks. Graph neural networks learns compact, low-dimensional
representations, i.e., embeddings, for nodes such that representation capture nodes’ local network
neighborhoods as well as nodes’ features [5, 3, 36]. The learned embeddings can be used for a variety
of downstream tasks [3]. Let hku ∈ RDk denote the embedding of node u in the k-th layer of GNN,
k = {1, . . . ,K}. The Dk stands for the dimension of hku. Note that h0u = xu. The computations
in the k-th layer consist of a message-passing function MSG, an aggregation function AGG, and an
update function UPD. This means that a GNN f can be specified as f = (MSG,AGG,UPD) [5, 32].
Given a node u and its neighbor v ∈ Nu, the messaging-passing function MSG specifies what
neural message mkuv needs to be propagated from v to u. The message is calculated by m
k
uv =
MSG(hku,h
k
v ,Auv), where MSG receives node embeddings of u and v along with their connectivity
information euv. This is followed by the aggregation function AGG that aggregates all messages
received by u. The aggregated message mˆku is computed by mˆ
k
u = AGG({mkuv; v ∈ N ∗u}). Lastly,
the update function UPD combines u’s embedding hku and the aggregated message mˆ
k
u to generate
the embedding for next layer as hk+1u = UPD(h
k
u, mˆ
k
u). The final node representation for u is h
K
u ,
i.e., the output of the K-th layer.
Background on poisoning attacks. Attackers try to fool a GNN by corrupting the graph topology
during training [37, 38]. The attacker carefully selects a small number of edges and manipulates
them through perturbation and rewiring. In doing so, the attacker aims to fool the GNN into making
incorrect predictions [18]. The attacker finds optimal perturbation A′ through optimization [26, 8]:
argmin
A′∈PG∆
Lattack(f(A′,X; Θ∗),y) s.t. Θ∗ = argmin
Θ
Lpredict(f(A′,X; Θ),y) (1)
where y denotes ground-truth labels, Lattack denotes the attacker’s loss function, and Lpredict denotes
GNN’s loss. The Θ∗ refers to optimal parameters and f(A′,X; Θ∗) is prediction of f with parameters
Θ∗ on the perturbed graph A′ and node features X . To ensure that attacker perturbs only a small
number of edges, a budget ∆ is defined to constrain the number of perturbed edges: ||A′−A||0 6 ∆
and PG∆ are perturbations that fit into budget ∆. Let T be target nodes that are intended to be
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mis-classified, and let A be attacker nodes that are allowed to be perturbed. We consider three types
of attacks. (1) Direct targeted attacks.i t t t tt .r r sec a e e a aci t t t tt .r r The attacker aims to destroy prediction for target node u by
manipulating the incident edges of u [8, 15]. Here, T = A = {u}. (2) Influence targeted attacks.fl t t tt .I r se ce a e e a acfl t t tt .I r
The attacker aims to destroy prediction for target node u by perturbing the edges of u’s neighbors.
Here, T = {u} and A = N ∗u . (3) Non-targeted attacks.t t tt .- r sa e e a act t tt .- r The attacker aims to degrade overall GNN
classification performance [26, 39]. Here, T = A = Vtest where Vtest denotes the test set.
3.1 GNNGUARD: Problem Formulation
GNNGUARD is a defense mechanism that is easy to integrate into any GNN f , resulting in a new
GNN f ′ that is robust to poisoning attacks. This means that f ′ can make correct predictions even
when trained on poisoned graph G′. Given a GNN f = (MSG,AGG,UPD), GNNGUARD will return
a new GNN f ′ = (MSG′,AGG′,UPD′), where MSG′ is the message-passing function, AGG′ is the
aggregation function, and UPD′ is the update function. The f ′ solves the following defense problem.
Problem (Defense Against Poisoning Attacks on Graphs). In a poisoning attack, the attacker
injects adversarial edges in G, meaning that the attack changes training data, which can decrease the
performance of GNN considerably. Let G′ denote the perturbed version of G that is poisoned by the
attack. We seek GNN f ′ such that for any node u ∈ G′:
min f ′u(G′)− fu(G), (2)
where f ′u(G′) = yˆ′u is the prediction when GNN f ′ is trained on G′. Here, fu(G) = yˆu denotes a
hypothetical prediction that the GNN would made if it had access to clean graph G.
It is worth noting that, in this paper, we learn a defense mechanism for semi-supervised node
classification. GNNGUARD is a general framework for defending any GNN on various graph
mining tasks such as link prediction. Since there exists a variety of GNNs that achieve competitive
performance on G, an intuitive idea is to force f ′u(G′) to approximate fu(G) and, in doing so, ensure
that f ′ will make correct predictions on G′. For this reason, we design f ′ to learn neural messages on
G′ that, in turn, are similar to the messages that a hypothetical f would learn on G. However, since it
is impossible to access clean graph G, Eq. (2) can not be directly optimized. The key to restore the
structure of G is to design a message-passing scheme that can detect fake edges, block them and then
attend to true, unperturbed edges. To this end, the impact of perturbed edges in G′can be mitigated by
manipulating the flow of neural messages and thus, the structure of G can be restored.
4 GNNGUARD
Next, we describe GNNGUARD, our GNN defender against poisoning attacks. Recent studies
found [27, 15] that most damaging attacks add fake edges between nodes that have different, i.e.,
dissimilar, features and labels. Because of that, the core defense principle of GNNGUARD is to detect
such fake edges and alleviate their negative impact on prediction by them or assigning them lower
weights in neural message passing. GNNGUARD has two key components: (1) neighbor importance
estimation, and (2) layer-wise graph memory, the first component being an essential part of a robust
GNN architecture while the latter is designed to smooth the defense.
4.1 Neighbor Importance Estimation
GNNGUARD estimates an importance weight for every edge euv to quantify how relevant node u is
to another node v in the sense that it allows for successful routing of GNN’s messages. In contrast
to attention mechanisms (e.g., GAT [19, 40]), GNNGUARD determines importance weights using
theory of network homophily [14], positing that similar nodes (i.e., nodes with similar features) are
more likely to interact than dissimilar nodes. To this end, we quantify similarity skuv between u and
its neighbor v in the k-th layer of GNN as follows: skuv = d(h
k
u,h
k
v) = (h
k
u  hkv)/(||hku||2||hkv ||2),
where d is a similarity function and  denotes dot product. In this work, we use cosine similarity for
d [41]. Larger similarity skuv indicates that edge euv is strongly supported by node features of the
edge’s endpoints.
We normalize skuv at the node-level within u’s neighborhood Nu. The problem here is to specify
what is the similarity of the node to itself. We normalize node similarities as:
αkuv =
{
skuv/
∑
v∈N∗u s
k
uv × Nˆku/(Nˆku + 1) if u 6= v
1/(Nˆku + 1) if u = v,
(3)
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Figure 2: A. Illustration of neural message passing in u’s local network neighborhood in the k-th layer of GNN
f . B. The message flow in f ′, which is the GNN f endowed by GNNGUARD defense. We first calculate defense
coefficients ωkuv based on node representations hku and hkv . The defense coefficients are then used to control the
message stream such as blocking the message from v but strengthening messages from v′ and v′′. Thick blue
arrow indicates the higher weights during message aggregation. To stabilize the evolution of graph structure,
current defense coefficients (e.g., ωkuv) keep a partial memory of the previous layer (e.g., ωk−1uv ).
where Nˆku =
∑
v∈N∗u ||skuv||0. We refer to αkuv as an importance weight representing the contribution
of node v towards node u in the GNN’s passing of neural messages in poisoned graph G′. In
doing so, GNNGUARD assigns small importance weights to suspicious neighbors, which reduce the
interference of suspicious nodes in GNN’s operation.
Further, to alleviate the impact of fake edges, we prune edges that are likely forged. Building on
network homophily and findings [15] that fake edges tend to connect dissimilar nodes, we prune edges
using importance weights. For that, we define a characteristic vector ckuv = [α
k
uv, α
k
vu] describing
edge euv. Although skuv = s
k
vu, it is key to note that α
k
uv 6= αkvu because of self-normalization in
Eq. (3). GNNGUARD calculates edge pruning probability for euv through a non-linear transformation
as σ(ckuvW ). Then, it maps the pruning probability to a binary indicator 1P0 : σ(c
k
uvW ) where P0
is a user-defined threshold:
1P0(σ(c
k
uvW )) =
{
0 if σ(ckuvW ) < P0
1 otherwise. (4)
Finally, we prune edges by updating importance weight αkuv to αˆ
k
uv as follows:
αˆkuv = α
k
uv1P0(σ(c
k
uvW )), (5)
meaning that the perturbed edges connecting dissimilar nodes will likely be ignored by the GNN.
4.2 Layer-Wise Graph Memory
Neighbor importance estimation and edge pruning change the graph structure between adjacent GNN
layers. This can destabilize GNN training, especially if a considerable number of edges gets pruned
in a single layer (e.g., due to the weight initialization). To allow for robust estimation of importance
weights and smooth evolution of edge pruning, we use layer-wise graph memory. This unit, applied
at each GNN layer, keeps partial memory of the pruned graph structure from the previous layer
(Figure 2). We define layer-wise graph memory as follows:
ωkuv = βω
k−1
uv + (1− β)αˆkuv, (6)
where ωkuv represents defense coefficient for edge euv in the k-th layer and β is a memory coefficient
specifying memory, i.e., the amount of information from the previous layer that should be kept in the
current layer. Memory coefficient β ∈ [0, 1] is a learnable parameter and is set to β = 0 in the first
GNN layer, meaning that ω0uv = αˆ
0
uv . Using defense coefficients, GNNGUARD controls information
flow across all neural message passing layers. It strengthens messages from u’s neighbors with higher
defense coefficients and weakens messages from u’s neighbors with lower defense coefficients.
4.3 Overview of GNNGUARD
GNNGUARD is shown in Algorithm 1. The method is easy to plug into an existing GNN to
defend the GNN against poisoning attacks. Given a GNN f = (MSG,AGG,UPD), GNNGUARD
formulates a revised version of it, called f ′ = (MSG′,AGG′,UPD′). In each layer, f ′ takes current
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node representations and (possibly attacked) graph G′. It estimates importance weights αˆuv and
generates defense coefficients ωuv by combining importance weights from the current layer and
defense coefficients from the previous layer. In summary, aggregation function AGG′ in layer k
is: AGG′ = AGG({ωkuv mkuv; v ∈ N ∗u}). The update function UPD′ is: UPD′ = UPD(ωkuu 
hku,AGG({ωkuv mkuv; v ∈ N ∗u})). The message function MSG′ remains unchanged MSG′ = MSG
as neural messages are specified by the original GNN f . Taken together, the guarded f ′ attends
differently to different node neighborhoods and propagates neural information only along most
relevant edges. Our derivations here are for undirected graphs with node features but can be extended
to directed graphs and edge features (e.g., include them into calculation of characteristic vectors).
Algorithm 1: GNNGUARD.
Input: GNN model of interest f = (MSG,AGG,UPD); Poisoned graph G′ = (V, E ′,X), (A′ is adjacency
matrix of E ′); Trainable parameters Θ,W , and β
Initialize parameters Θ,W , and β; initialize node representations h0u = xu ∀u ∈ V
for layer k ← 1 to K do
for u ∈ V do
Calculate αkuv using Eq. (3) for all v ∈ Nu // Neighbor Importance Estimation
ckuv = [α
k
uv, α
k
vu]
αˆkuv = α
k
uv1P0(σ(c
k
uvW )) using Eq. (5)
ωkuv = βω
k−1
uv + (1− β)αˆkuv using Eq. (6) // Layer-Wise Graph Memory
mkuv = MSG′(hku,hku,A′uv) using Section 4.3 // Neural Message Passing
mˆku = AGG′({ωkuv mkuv; v ∈ N ∗u}) using Section 4.3
hk+1u = UPD′(ωkuu  hku, mˆku) using Section 4.3
end
end
Any GNN model. State-of-the-art GNNs use neural message passing comprising of MSG, AGG, and
UPD functions. As we demonstrate in experiments, GNNGUARD can defend such GNN architectures
against adversarial attacks. GNNGUARD works with many GNNs, including Graph Convolutional
Network (GCN) [3], Graph Attention Network (GAT) [19], Graph Isomorphism Network (GIN) [7],
Jumping Knowledge (JK-Net) [20], GraphSAINT [21], GraphSAGE [36], and SignedGCN [42].
Computational complexity. GNNGUARD is practically efficient because it exploits the sparse
structure of real-world graphs. The time complexity of neighbor importance estimation is O(DkE)
in layer k, where Dk is the embedding dimensionality and E is the graph size, and the complexity of
layer-wise graph memory is O(E). This means that time complexity of GNNGUARD grows linearly
with the size of the graph as node embeddings are low-dimensional, Dk  E. Finally, the time
complexity of a GNN endowed with GNNGUARD is on the same order as that of the GNN itself.
Further related work on adversarial defense for graphs. We briefly contrast GNNGUARD with
existing GNN defenders. Compared to GNN-Jaccard [15], which examines fake edges as a GNN
preprocessing step, GNNGUARD dynamically updates defense coefficients at every GNN layer for
defense. In contrast to RobustGCN [17], which is limited to GCN, a particular GNN variant, and
is challenging to use with other GNNs, GNNGUARD provides a generic mechanism that is easy to
use with many GNN architectures. Further, in contrast to GNN-SVD [16], which uses only graph
structure for defense, GNNGUARD takes advantage of information encoded in both node features and
graph structure. Also, [16] is designed specifically for the Nettack attacker [8] and so is less versatile.
Another technique [18] uses transfer learning to detect fake edges. While that is an interesting idea,
it requires a large number of clean graphs from the same domain to successfully train the transfer
model. On the contrary, GNNGUARD takes advantage of correlation between node features and
graph structure and does not need any external data. Further, recent studies (e.g., [43, 44]) focus on
theoretical certificates for GNN robustness instead of defense mechanisms. That is an important but
orthogonal direction to this paper, where the focus is on a practical adversarial defense framework.
5 Experiments
Datasets. We test GNNGUARD on four graphs. We use two citation networks with undirected edges
and binary features: Cora [45] and Citeseer [46]. We also consider a directed graph with numeric
node features, ogbn-arxiv [47], representing a citation network of CS papers published between 1971
and 2014. We use a Disease Pathway (DP) [48] graph with continuous features describing a system
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Table 1: Defense performance (multi-class classification accuracy) against direct targeted attacks.
Model Dataset No Attack Attack GNN-Jaccard RobustGCN GNN-SVD GNNGUARD
Cora 0.826 0.250 0.525 0.215 0.475 0.705
Citeseer 0.721 0.175 0.435 0.230 0.615 0.720
ogbn-arxiv 0.667 0.235 0.305 0.245 0.370 0.425GCN
DP 0.682 0.215 0.340 0.315 0.395 0.430
Cora 0.827 0.245 0.295 0.215 0.365 0.625
Citeseer 0.718 0.265 0.575 0.230 0.575 0.765
ogbn-arxiv 0.669 0.210 0.355 0.245 0.445 0.520GAT
DP 0.714 0.205 0.320 0.315 0.335 0.445
Cora 0.831 0.270 0.375 0.215 0.375 0.645
Citeseer 0.725 0.285 0.570 0.230 0.570 0.755
ogbn-arxiv 0.661 0.315 0.425 0.245 0.475 0.640GIN
DP 0.719 0.245 0.410 0.315 0.405 0.460
Cora 0.834 0.305 0.445 0.215 0.425 0.690
Citeseer 0.724 0.275 0.615 0.230 0.610 0.775
ogbn-arxiv 0.678 0.335 0.375 0.245 0.325 0.635JK-Net
DP 0.726 0.220 0.335 0.315 0.360 0.450
Cora 0.821 0.225 0.535 0.235 0.460 0.695
Citeseer 0.716 0.195 0.470 0.350 0.395 0.770
ogbn-arxiv 0.683 0.245 0.365 0.245 0.315 0.375
Graph
SAINT
DP 0.739 0.205 0.315 0.295 0.330 0.485
of interacting proteins whose malfunction collectively leads to diseases. The task is to predict for
every protein node what diseases the protein might cause. Details are in Appendix D.
Setup. (1) Generating adversarial attacks.ti i l tt .r rs r se e a a e a a a acti i l tt .r r r We compare our model to baselines under three kinds
of adversarial attacks: direct targeted attack (Nettack-Di [8]), influence targeted attack (Nettack-
In [8]), and non-targeted attack (Mettack [26]). In Mettack, we set the perturbation rate as 20% (i.e.,
∆ = 0.2E) with ‘Meta-Self’ training strategy. In Nettack-Di, ∆ = Nˆ0u . In Nettack-In, we perturb 5
neighbors of the target node and set ∆ = Nˆ0v for all neighbors. In the targeted attack, we select 40
correctly classified target nodes (following [8]): 10 nodes with the largest classification margin, 20
random nodes, and 10 nodes with the smallest margin. We run the whole attack and defense procedure
for each target node and report average classification accuracy. (2) GNNs..s. We integrate GNNGUARD
with five GNNs (GCN [3], GAT [19], GIN [7], JK-Net [20], and GraphSAINT [21]) and present
the defense performance against adversarial attacks. (3) Baseline defense algorithms.li l it .s f s r sa e e e e e ali l it .f r We compare
GNNGUARD to three state-of-the-art graph defenders: GNN-Jaccard [15], RobustGCN [17], and
GNN-SVD [16]. Hyperparameters and model architectures are in Appendix E.
5.1 Results: Defense Against Targeted and Non-Targeted Attacks
(1) Results for direct targeted attacks.lt i t t t tt .s s f r r r se ec a e e a aclt i t t t tt .f r r r We observe in Table 1 that Nettack-Di is a strong attacker
and dramatically cuts down the performance of all GNNs (cf. “Attack” vs. “No Attack” columns).
However, the proposed GNNGUARD outperforms state-of-art defense methods by 15.3% in the accu-
racy on average. Further, it successfully restores the performance of GNNs to the level comparable
to when there is no attack. We also observe that RobustGCN fails to defend against Nettack-Di,
possibly because the Gaussian layer in RobustGCN cannot absorb big effects when all fake edges
are in the vicinity of a target node. In contrast, GNN-SVD works well here because it is sensitive
to high-rank noise caused by the perturbation of many edges that are incident to a single node. (2)
Results for influence targeted attacks.lt i fl t t tt .s s f r r se e ce a e e a aclt i fl t t tt .f r r As shown in Table 2, GNNGUARD achieves the best classifica-
tion accuracy comparing to other baseline defense algorithms. Taking a closer look at the results, we
we can find that Nettack-In is relatively less threaten than Nettack-Di indicating part of the perturbed
information was scattered during neural message passing. (3) Results for non-targeted attacks.lt t t tt .s s f r - r se a e e a aclt t t tt .f r - r Table
2 shows that Mettack has a considerable negative impact on GNN performance, decreasing the
accuracy of even the strongest GNN by 18.7% on average. Moreover, we see that GNNGUARD
achieves a competitive performance and outperforms baselines in 19 out of 20 settings. In summary,
experiments show the GNNGUARD consistently outperforms all baseline defense techniques. Fur-
ther, GNNGUARD can defend a variety of GNNs against different types of attacks, indicating that
GNNGUARD is a powerful GNN defender against adversarial poisoning.
5.2 Results: Ablation Study and Inspection of Defense Mechanism
(1) Ablation study.l ti t .sal ti t . We conduct an ablation study to evaluate the necessity of every component of
GNNGUARD. For that, we took the largest dataset (ogbn-arxiv) and the most threatening attack
(Nettack-Di) as an example. Results are in Table 3 (Left). We observe that full GNNGUARD behaves
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Table 2: Defense performance (multi-class classification accuracy) against influence targeted (top) and non-
targeted (bottom) attacks. Tables with full results for other GNN models are in Appendix A (influence targeted
attacks) and Appendix B (non-targeted attacks).
Model Dataset No Attack Attack GNN-Jaccard RobustGCN GNN-SVD GNNGUARD
Cora 0.831 0.525 0.635 0.605 0.615 0.775
Citeseer 0.725 0.480 0.675 0.575 0.630 0.845
ogbn-arxiv 0.661 0.570 0.605 0.620 0.525 0.710GIN
DP 0.719 0.505 0.585 0.565 0.605 0.695
Cora 0.831 0.588 0.702 0.571 0.692 0.722
Citeseer 0.725 0.565 0.638 0.583 0.615 0.711
ogbn-arxiv 0.661 0.424 0.459 0.436 0.459 0.486GIN
DP 0.719 0.537 0.559 0.528 0.513 0.571
Table 3: (Left) Ablation study on ogbn-arxiv dataset. ‘Memory’ denotes layer-wise graph memory (Section 4.2).
(Right) Attack and defense accuracy with different attack intensity on Cora dataset.
Model No Defense GNNGUARD w/o memory Full GNNGUARD
GCN 0.235±0.003 0.405±0.07 0.425±0.002
GAT 0.210±0.005 0.475±0.011 0.520±0.004
GIN 0.315±0.007 0.610±0.012 0.640±0.006
JK-Net 0.335±0.006 0.625±0.009 0.635±0.003
GraphSAINT 0.245±0.013 0.360±0.019 0.375±0.007
Attack Rate (% edges) No Defense GNNGUARD
5% 0.771 0.776
10% 0.716 0.749
15% 0.651 0.739
20% 0.578 0.714
25% 0.531 0.729
better and has smaller standard deviation than limited GNNGUARD w/o layer-wise graph memory,
suggesting that graph memory can contribute to defense performance and stabilize model training.
(2) Node classification on clean datasets.l ifi ti l t t .ss s se c a ca c ea a a el ifi ti l t t . In principle, we don’t know if the input graph has been
attacked or not. Because of that, it is important that a successful GNN defender can deal with
poisoned graphs and also does not harm GNN performance on clean datasets. Appendix C shows
classification accuracy of GNNs on clean graphs. Across all datasets, we see that, when graphs
are not attacked, GNNs with turned-on GNNGUARD achieve performance comparable to that of
GNNs alone, indicating that GNNGUARD will not weaken learning ability of GNNs when there is no
attack. (3) Defense under different attack intensity.i t tt i t it .f s r ff r se e e e e e a ac ei t tt i t it .f r ff r We investigate defense performance as a function
of attack strength. Table 3 (Right) shows attack and defense results on Cora under Mettack with
increasing attack rates. It is expected that GCN accuracy decays as attacks intensify. Nevertheless,
GNNGUARD effectively defends GCN and can do so especially under strong attack. GCN with
GNNGUARD outperforms GCN with no defense by 19.8% when 25% of the edges are attacked.
A case study of attack and defense. We report an example of attack and defense illustrating how
GNNGUARD works. Let’s examine the paper “TreeP: A Tree Based P2P Network Architecture” by
Hudzia et al. [49] that received four citations. The topic/label of this paper (i.e., node u in ogbn-arxiv
graph G) and its cited works (i.e., neighbors) is Internet Technology (IT). A GIN [7] trained on clean
ogbn-arxiv graph makes a correct prediction for the paper with high confidence, fu(G) = 0.536.
Then, we poison the paper using Nettack-Di attacker, which adds four fake citations between the
paper and some very dissimilar papers from the Artificial Intelligence (AI) field. We re-trained GIN
on perturbed graph G′ and found the resulting classifier misclassifies the paper [49] into topic AI with
confidence of fu(G′) = 0.201, which is high on this prediction task with 40 distinct topics/labels.
This fragility is especially worrisome as the attacker has only injected four fake citations and was
already able to easily fool a state-of-the-art GNN. We then re-trained GIN with GNNGUARD defense
on the same perturbed graph and, remarkably, the paper [49] was correctly classified to IT with high
confidence (f ′u(G′) = 0.489) even after the attack. This example illustrates how easily an adversary
can fool a powerful graph ML algorithm on citation networks.
6 Conclusion
We introduce GNNGUARD, an algorithm for defending any graph neural network (GNN) against
poisoning attacks, including direct targeted, influence targeted, and non-targeted attacks. GNN-
GUARD mitigates adverse effects by modifying neural message passing of the underlying GNN.
This is achieved through the estimation of neighbor relevance and the use of graph memory, which
are two critical components that are vital for a successful defense. In doing so, GNNGUARD can
prune likely fake edges and assign less weight to suspicious edges, a principle grounded in network
theory of homophily. Experiments on four datasets and across five GNNs show that GNNGUARD
outperforms state-of-the-art defense algorithms by a large margin. Lastly, it would be interesting to
extend GNNGUARD to fight adversaries that exploit structural equivalence (a principle orthogonal to
homophily). While such adversarial attackers do not exist yet, this is a fruitful future direction.
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Appendices to “GNNGUARD: Defending Graph
Neural Networks against Adversarial Attacks”
Appendix A Defense Performance Against Influence Targeted Attacks
Results are shown in Table 4. We find that the proposed GNNGUARD achieves the best defensive
performance against influence targeted attack across five GNN models and four datasets. In particular,
GNNGUARD outperforms state-of-the-art defense models by 8.77% on average. Furthermore,
compared to the case where the GNN is attacked without any defense, GNNGUARD brings a
significant accuracy improvement of 22.6% on average. Remarkably, results show that even most
recently published GNNs (e.g., GraphSAINT [21]) are sensitive to adversarial perturbations of the
graph structure (cf. “Attack” vs. “No Attack” columns in Table 4), yet GNNGUARD can successfully
defend GNNs against influence targeted attacks and can restore their performance to levels comparable
to learning on clean, non-attacked graphs.
Table 4: Defense performance (multi-class classification accuracy) against influence targeted attacks.
Model Dataset No Attack Attack GNN-Jaccard RobustGCN GNN-SVD GNNGUARD
Cora 0.826 0.410 0.520 0.605 0.425 0.665
Citeseer 0.721 0.435 0.675 0.575 0.615 0.745
ogbn-arxiv 0.667 0.545 0.615 0.620 0.445 0.725GCN
DP 0.682 0.475 0.550 0.565 0.460 0.655
Cora 0.827 0.425 0.550 0.605 0.450 0.635
Citeseer 0.718 0.510 0.675 0.575 0.615 0.815
ogbn-arxiv 0.669 0.635 0.525 0.620 0.505 0.675GAT
DP 0.714 0.470 0.540 0.565 0.570 0.645
Cora 0.831 0.525 0.635 0.605 0.615 0.775
Citeseer 0.725 0.480 0.675 0.575 0.630 0.845
ogbn-arxiv 0.661 0.570 0.605 0.620 0.525 0.710GIN
DP 0.719 0.505 0.585 0.565 0.605 0.695
Cora 0.834 0.525 0.665 0.605 0.625 0.755
Citeseer 0.724 0.485 0.675 0.575 0.610 0.865
ogbn-arxiv 0.678 0.545 0.580 0.620 0.475 0.720JK-Net
DP 0.726 0.495 0.635 0.565 0.590 0.685
Cora 0.821 0.405 0.495 0.610 0.395 0.645
Citeseer 0.716 0.460 0.665 0.590 0.605 0.735
ogbn-arxiv 0.683 0.525 0.595 0.615 0.570 0.705
Graph
SAINT
DP 0.739 0.435 0.615 0.645 0.575 0.675
1
Appendix B Defense Performance Against Non-Targeted Attacks
Results are shown in Table 5. To evaluate how harmful non-targeted attacks can be for GNNs, we first
give results without attack and under attack (without defense), i.e., “Attack” vs. “No Attack” columns
in Table 5. We also show defense performance of GNNGUARD relative to state-of-the-art GNN
defense techniques. First, we find that non-targeted attacks can have a considerable negative impact
on the performance of the GNNs. The accuracy of even the strongest GNN is reduced by 18.7% on
average. In addition, results show that our GNNGUARD outperforms baselines in most experiments
and improves upon baselines considerably. Experiments indicate the proposed GNN defender can
successfully mitigate negative impacts brought forward by non-targeted attacks on graphs.
Table 5: Defense performance (multi-class classification accuracy) against non-targeted attacks.
Model Dataset No Attack Attack GNN-Jaccard RobustGCN GNN-SVD GNNGUARD
Cora 0.826 0.578 0.684 0.571 0.678 0.714
Citeseer 0.721 0.601 0.646 0.583 0.668 0.681
ogbn-arxiv 0.667 0.410 0.409 0.436 0.413 0.444GCN
DP 0.682 0.487 0.513 0.528 0.493 0.539
Cora 0.827 0.566 0.691 0.571 0.681 0.718
Citeseer 0.718 0.676 0.667 0.583 0.680 0.699
ogbn-arxiv 0.669 0.420 0.428 0.436 0.433 0.432GAT
DP 0.714 0.519 0.548 0.528 0.534 0.566
Cora 0.831 0.588 0.702 0.571 0.692 0.722
Citeseer 0.725 0.565 0.638 0.583 0.615 0.711
ogbn-arxiv 0.661 0.424 0.459 0.436 0.459 0.486GIN
DP 0.719 0.537 0.559 0.528 0.513 0.571
Cora 0.834 0.615 0.726 0.571 0.683 0.713
Citeseer 0.724 0.574 0.647 0.583 0.679 0.698
ogbn-arxiv 0.678 0.433 0.419 0.436 0.443 0.457JK-Net
DP 0.726 0.486 0.537 0.528 0.541 0.587
Cora 0.821 0.657 0.617 0.659 0.647 0.705
Citeseer 0.716 0.628 0.596 0.637 0.652 0.659
ogbn-arxiv 0.683 0.394 0.428 0.563 0.533 0.583
Graph
SAINT
DP 0.739 0.473 0.572 0.499 0.524 0.537
Appendix C Classification Accuracy on Clean (i.e., Non-attacked) Datasets
with and without GNNGUARD
Next, we want to investigate whether the GNN defender can harm the performance of the underlying
GNN if the defender is used on clean, non-attacked graphs. Note that this is a practically important
question, as in practice, users might not know a priori whether malicious agents have altered their
graph datasets. Because of that, it is essential that a successful GNN defender does not decrease the
predictive performance of the GNN in cases when GNNGUARD is turned on, but there is no attack.
From results in the main paper and Appendix A-B, we already know that GNNGUARD can defend
GNNs when they are attacked. Here, we show that GNNGUARD does not hinder GNNs even when
they are not attacked.
Results are shown in Table 6. We observe that GNNs, trained on clean datasets, yield approxi-
mately the same performance irrespective of whether a GNN integrates GNNGUARD defense or not.
These results suggest that the use of GNNGUARD does not reduce GNN’s expressive power or its
representation capacity when there are no adversarial attacks.
Appendix D Further Details on Datasets
Upon publication, we will share GNNGUARD implementation as well as all datasets and baseline
algorithms with the community through a public project website, which will be accompanied by a
Github repository with relevant data loaders.
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Table 6: Classification accuracy on clean (i.e., non-attacked) datasets with and without GNNGUARD.
Cora-CLEAN Citeseer-CLEAN ogbn-arxiv-CLEAN DP-CLEAN
w/o w w/o w w/o w w/o w
GCN 0.826 0.817 0.721 0.716 0.667 0.683 0.682 0.681
GAT 0.827 0.829 0.718 0.719 0.669 0.674 0.714 0.717
GIN 0.831 0.832 0.725 0.726 0.661 0.671 0.719 0.716
JK-Net 0.834 0.829 0.724 0.727 0.678 0.682 0.726 0.731
GraphSAINT 0.821 0.819 0.716 0.721 0.683 0.669 0.739 0.727
Table 7: Dataset statistics. N , E , M , and C denote the number of nodes, edges, node feature dimensionality,
and the number of labels/classes, respectively.
Dataset N E M C Node features
Cora 2,485 5,069 1,433 7 Binary
Citeseer 2,110 3,668 3,703 6 Binary
ogbn-arxiv 31,971 71,669 128 40 Continuous
DP 22,552 342,353 73 519 Continuous
We provide further dataset statistics in Table 7.
The new, Disease Pathway (DP) [48] dataset describes a system of interacting human proteins whose
malfunction collectively leads to a variety of diseases. Nodes in the network represent human proteins
and edges indicate protein-protein interactions. The task is to predict for every protein node what
diseases (i.e., labels/classes) that protein might cause. The dataset has 73-dimensional continuous
node features representing graphlet-orbit counts (i.e., the number of occurrences of higher-order
network motifs), which we normalize via z-scores. This is a multi label node classification dataset.
We select 10 most-common labels (diseases), reformulate the task as 10 independent balanced
binary classification problems and report average performance across multiple independent runs. We
randomly split the dataset into training (10%), validation (10%), and test set (80%) following the
experimental setup in [8].
Appendix E Further Details on Hyperparameter Setting
To select hyperparameters and GNN model architectures, we closely follow original authors’ guide-
lines and relevant papers on GNNs (GCN [3], GAT [19], GIN [7], JK-Net [20], and Graph-
SAINT [21]), baseline defense algorithms (GNN-Jaccard [15], RobustGCN [17], and GNN-
SVD [16]), and models for generating adversarial attacks (Nettack-Di [8], Nettack-In [8], and
Mettack [26]).
We use PyTorch DeepRobust package (https://github.com/DSE-MSU/DeepRobust) to
implement adversarial attack models and baseline defense algorithms, and PyTorch Geometric
package (https://github.com/rusty1s/pytorch_geometric) to implement and train
GNN models. In all experiments, we set the number of epochs to 200 and use early stopping (we
stop training if validation accuracy does not increase for 10 consecutive epochs). We repeat every
experiment 5 times and report average performance across independent runs. We set P0 = 0.5,
K = 2, D2 = 16, and dropout rate as 0.5, optimize cross-entropy loss using Adam optimizer and
learning rate of 0.01. For other parameters, we follow the setup in [8].
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